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Abstract. In order to analyse the determinants of tax evasion, the existing literature
on individual tax compliance typically takes a prior-to-audit point of view. This
paper focuses on a post-audit, post-detection  so far unexplored  framework,
by investigating what happens after tax evasion has been discovered and noncompliant
taxpayers are asked to pay their debts. We rst develop a two-period dynamic model of
individual choice, considering an individual that has been already audited and detected
as tax evader, who knows that Tax Authorities are looking for her to cash the due
amount. We derive the optimal decision of running away in order to avoid paying
the bill, and show that the experience of a prior tax notice reduces the probability
to behave as a sco­ aw. We then exploit information on post-audit, post-detection
tax compliance provided by an Italian collection agency for the period 2004-2007 to
empirically test the e¤ectiveness of the prior notice against sco­ aws. The evidence from
alternative logit model specications supports our theoretical prediction: experiencing
a tax notice reduces the probability of running away by about 10%. However, this may
prove to be insu¢ cient to discourage some individuals to runaway in order to avoid
paying their dues.
JEL Codes: D81; H26; H30; K42
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1 Introduction
Tax evasion is one of the most important problems that Tax Administrations need to
tackle all around the world, but o¢ cial statistics on tax frauds are di¢ cult to obtain
since tax evasion is typically unobserved. Estimates of the shadow economy provided,
e.g., by Schneider and Enste (2000) suggest that the problem is huge in countries
like Nigeria, Egypt, and Thailand, where the shadow economy represents about 70%
of GDP on average during the period 1990-1993. The problem is relevant also in
OECD Mediterranean countries (like Italy, Spain, and Greece) and in Belgium, where
the equivalent gure over the same period amounts to 24-30% of GDP. The lowest
estimates are referred to Switzerland, Japan, the United States and Austria, where
the shadow economy still covers about 8-10% of GDP. Given the importance of the
problem, it is not surprising that in the economic literature a large number of papers
has been produced on the topic of tax evasion (see, e.g., the surveys in Cowell, 1990;
Andreoni et al., 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki; 2002). As for economic theory, the
standard approach à la Allingham and Sandmo (1972) typically takes a prior-to-
audit point of view, showing the responsiveness of tax evasion to variations in the
tax-enforcement parameters, using a one-period expected utility model.1 This basic
approach has been extended to investigate the dynamics of tax compliance, considering
current compliance as a function of past reports and audit experiences. But the ndings
on the responsiveness of the decision to evade taxes to past audit experiences do not
lead to univocal conclusions. In fact, the update of beliefs about a future audit can
lead either to an increase or to a decrease in compliance, depending on the degree of
risk aversion (e.g., Snow and Warren, 2007). Also the empirical works based on this
theoretical literature provide mixed results on the impact of tax-enforcement e¤orts
on compliance. In particular, the ndings of the few papers based on actual evasion
data partially conict with the larger literature based on laboratory experiments (e.g.,
Erard, 1992; Bergman and Nevarez, 2006).
However, what is missing in the current literature is what happens after tax cheat-
ers have been discovered: Are Tax Authorities really able to cash the due amounts?
Di¢ culties to obtain reliable data on this stage are even more than those encountered
for tax evasion. An almost unique source at the global level are the estimates of tax
1For an exhaustive and critical discussion of the main ndings derived within the basic framework
of tax compliance decisions, see the surveys by Cowell (2004) and Sandmo (2006).
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arrears (i.e., all unpaid taxes, including those where a dispute is involved, for all years
recorded on taxpayersaccounts) provided by the OECD, that seem to hint to a neg-
ative answer for the question posed above: in 2004, unpaid taxes were 51.3 % of net
annual revenue collections in Portugal, 42.8% in Greece, 38.7% in Belgium (OECD,
2007)). Therefore, in these countries not only people evade taxes to a large extent, but
they also do not seem to pay their debts once their frauds have been detected.
Besides OECD statistics, this inability to collect taxes surfaces from a variety of
sources, hard to nd, for di¤erent countries. A vivid example are the USA. According
to Burman (2003), in a statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee
on the Budget, «the IRS assesses almost $30 billion of taxes that it will never collect.
This is not theoretical tax evasion. The $30 billion represents underpayments of tax
that the IRS has identied but cannot collect because its sta¤ is spread so thin. [. . . ]
According to IRS estimates, 60 percent of identied tax debts are never collected.
These unclosed cases include: 75% of identied nonlers; 79% of taxpayers who use
known abusive devicesto avoid taxes; 78% of taxpayers identied through document
matching programs. It is possible that some of these people simply cannot a¤ord to
pay their tax debts, but more than half  56%  of noncompliant taxpayers with
incomes over $100,000 get o¤ scot-free. It is demoralizing to honest taxpayers, and
encouraging to tax sco­ aws, that your odds are better than even of avoiding your tax
bill, even if you are caught» .
In this paper, we move a rst step in trying to ll this gap in the literature by
focusing on what happens after tax evasion has been discovered and noncompliant
taxpayers are asked to pay their debts. Our contribution is twofold. We rst develop
a two-period dynamic model à la Allingham and Sandmo (1972) to analyze the post-
audit, post-detectionindividuals choice problem on a peculiar action to be taken to
avoid paying the tax bill, and study the impact of a previous tax notice on individuals
compliance decision. In particular, we consider individuals who have already been
detected by Tax Authorities as noncompliant and who can then decide to runaway, by
changing their addressin order to hide out and escape the notication by collection
agents, thus avoiding to pay their bill (i.e., to behave as sco­ aws). Looking at the data
we obtained from an Italian collection agency, this is what happens in the real world
for a considerable number of tax evaders. We then propose an empirical test based on
real data, exploiting a sort of natural experiment on information dissemination by
Tax Authorities about their enforcement e¤orts by means of the tax notice. We focus
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on Italy, a country where estimated tax evasion is high, Tax Code is complex, general
reprobation among citizens due to tax evasion is low (e.g., Cannari and DAlessio, 2007),
and the collection system is ine¢ cient. Not surprisingly, also the problem of cashing
due (unpaid) taxes is large. According to available estimates provided by the Italian
Agency for Internal Revenues (Agenzia delle Entrate), in 2007 only 1.57% of the total
amount of taxpayersrolls has been cashed by collection agencies. Moreover, taking
for instance the 2000 Tax Year, only 8.73% of the outstanding debts have been cashed
after eight years. The situation was even worst in the past, and it recently improved in
2005, with the institution of a state-owned corporation (Riscossione S.p.A.) in charge
of the enforcement of the collection procedure through taxpayersroll and tax notice.
In line with the prediction of our theoretical model, the empirical analysis shows a
clear negative e¤ect (about 10%) of a previous tax notice on the probability of running
away in the attempt to escape a subsequent tax notice. However, this may prove to be
insu¢ cient to discourage some individuals to runaway in order to avoid paying their
dues.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides essential
background information on the tax collection procedure in Italy, with a particular
emphasis on the collection of taxes by taxpayersroll. In Section 3 we propose a simple
and stylized model of individual choice to study how the taxpayers decision of changing
address in order to avoid paying the bill is a¤ected by the presence of a prior notice.
Section 4 presents the data and our empirical tests on the relationship between the
probability of moving and the experience of a tax notice. Section 5 concludes and
provides some policy suggestions for increasing the e¤ectiveness of the tax collection
procedure.
2 The collection of taxes by taxpayersroll
In this section we briey describe the institutional features characterizing the collection
of taxes by taxpayersroll and the tax notice procedure in Italy. With respect to self-
taxation, these represent extra-ordinaryways of tax payment, which occur after an
audit and a detection of fraud by Tax Authorities. According to the Italian Tax Code,
audit and detection of frauds must happen within ve to seven years from the scal year
which the episode of tax cheating is referred to. These time limits usually correspond
to the lag with which Tax Authorities e¤ectively audit (and then eventually notice)
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taxpayers.
When  for some individuals  tax frauds have been discovered, Tax Authorities
issue a tax roll, i.e., a list of taxpayers and of their due amounts including fees, interests
and a collection agencys premium. The tax roll becomes a document of execution with
the sign of the legal ownership of the Tax Authority that issued the roll. Notice also
that the tax roll clearly includes all payments that are due to a Public Administration,
e.g. income taxes and local taxes as well as other revenue receipts, like royalty rents,
licence fees and administrative sanctions.
All the tax rolls issued by Tax Authorities are periodically sent to collection agencies
in charge of collecting taxes in specic geographical areas on the basis of the taxpayers
residence. It is up to collection agencies to notice to each individual included in a tax
roll the amount of taxes that are due (in other words, to deliver the bill). According
to the Italian law, the notice must occur within a set time limit, that lies between one
and three years according to the type of audit. This further increases the time lag
between the initial decision to evade taxes and the time when Tax Authorities attempt
at cashing due taxes.
The notice plays a crucial role in the collection procedure, because only noticed tax
debts allow Tax Authorities to legally expropriate the taxpayers assets whenever the
taxpayer will not pay the due amount within the term of two months starting from
the day of the notice. The most important problem of collection agencies is that in
many cases the taxpayer is di¢ cult to nd or, in extreme cases, her address is unknown
(because she hides out). Using the jargon of collection agencies, we talk here of the
taxpayers changing address. According to practitioners (and actual data, as we show
in the empirical part of the paper), this is an important phenomenon: if the collection
agency is not able to discover where the taxpayer hides, then the notice will not take
place within the set time limit. Moreover, even if the law provides for the notice to
occur without nding the taxpayer, its e¤ectiveness is clearly awed. Hence, hiding
from Tax Authorities is a way to avoid scal obligations and to make ine¤ective the
provisions of the Tax Code.
On the other hand, an individual to whom a tax return form has been noticed has
two opportunities: she can pay or not the due amount to the collection agency within
two months. If she pays, then her obligation comes to an end. Otherwise, she can
appeal against the tax return form to the Tax Court, or she can simply decide not to
pay, behaving as a sco­ aw. If she decides not to pay, then the collection agency starts
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the enforcement within a year from the day of the notice, by expropriating taxpayer
assets (if she clearly has some). In both cases, by receiving a notice the individual
becomes aware of the enforcement e¤orts by Tax Authorities. The notice can then
be interpreted as a signal of these enforcement e¤orts, which is likely to inuence
taxpayers future compliance (like information on audits in, e.g., Alm et al., 2009, and
Gemmell and Ratto, 2012). Identifying this impact is our goal in the analysis to follow.
3 Modelling the behavior of tax sco­ aws
We develop here a stylized model of the individual choice about whether attempting
to escape the notication of a tax roll by changing address (or running away). Since
our main focus is to highlight the impact of a previous notication on the decision
about attempting to escape a subsequent notication, we build a simple two-period
dynamic model in which the Tax Authorities issue two (successive) tax rolls to be
notied to the taxpayer. The theoretical framework is based on the standard expected
utility paradigm à la Allingham and Sandmo (1972), which is adapted to the case of a
post-audit, post-detectionsituation that spans over two periods of time.
A tax cheater has evaded taxes twice in the past. The Tax Administration has
detected both acts of misbehavior and it has issued two separate tax rolls that the tax-
collection agency will try to notify at the tax evaders known address at di¤erent dates.
The tax cheater is perfectly informed about this; therefore, we represent her problem
as a two-stage decision tree, which is illustrated in Figure 1. In stage 1, the Agency
attempts to notify the rst tax roll, of amount f1 > 0, which includes due taxes plus
nes. Having anticipated the visit of the tax collector, the tax evader decides whether
to hide by changing address (h1 = 1), at a cost c > 0, or not to hide (h1 = 0), in which
case no cost is incurred. In the latter case, the tax roll is notied and the due amount
is collected. Instead, if the taxpayer runs away, then with probability 1  p, p 2 (0; 1),
she escapes notication and the payment of taxes and nes, whereas with probability
p she is discovered and the due amount is collected.
Following the taxpayers decision and the notication outcome in stage 1, there
are three Decision Nodes in stage 2, which are labelled DN*, DN** and DN***. In
all nodes, the agency tries to notify the second tax roll, of amount f2 > 0, while the
tax evader has again to take the choice of whether attempting (hDN2 = 1), or not
attempting (hDN2 = 0), to escape the notication. Again, c is the cost of hiding and p
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is the probability of notication for a running taxpayer.2
We assume that there is a large population of tax cheaters, each one characterized
by the level of her gross income, w > 0, and the amounts of the tax rolls, f1 and f2.
We also assume that the cost of hiding by changing address, c, as well as the detection
probability, p, are the same for all individuals. To simplify the analysis, we also make
the following assumption.
Assumption 1 For all taxpayers: (i) f1 > c and f2 > c; (ii) w   2c  f1   f2 > 0.
Assumption 1(i) allows us to focus only on those individuals for whom it may be
worth trying to escape the notication of the tax bills. In fact, it is never worth hiding
by bearing a cost which is greater than the due ne. Assumption 1(ii) holds that the tax
cheater has enough resources to pay for unsuccessful attempts to avoid the notication
of both tax rolls. In fact, it is reasonable to think that gross income w bears a positive
correlation with the level of tax evasion, which in turn is linked to the level of the due
nes f1 and f2.
Let T  R3+ be the (compact) set of taxpayerstypes, satisfying Assumption 1, with
t = fw; f1; f2g a typical element of T . We normalize the population mass to unity and
we denote with (w; f1; f2) the cumulative distribution function of taxpayerstypes.
We assume that all taxpayers have the same preferences over net income, x, which
are represented by the cardinal utility function u(x), and that preferences over lotteries
are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function. Concerning
the function u(x), we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 2 The cardinal utility of net income, u(x), is a three times continuously
di¤erentiable function, strictly increasing and strictly concave. Moreover, for any triplet
2We assume that both the cost of hiding, c, and the probability of detection, p, are the same
in stages 1 and 2. One could argue that a taxpayer opting for hiding in stage 1, and that escaped
notication (hence moving from DN*** in stage 2), would incur a cost lower than c if opting to hide
also in stage 2. Instead, we assume that she bears the full cost c also in this case, for the reason that
this is the hypothesis which is less favorable to the theoretical prediction we are looking for, namely
that a notication in stage 1 reduces the probability of hiding in stage 2. Notice also that we are
assuming that the taxpayer knows in advance (in stage 1) that the tax collection agency will try to
notify two tax rolls of amounts f1 and f2. More realistically, we could have assumed that the rst tax
roll is issued with certainty, while the second one is issued with probability  < 1. In this case, ex-ante
(i.e., in stage 1) the issue of the second tax roll would be an uncertain event. However, this extension,
while not a¤ecting the results, would increase complexity.
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of scalars fx1; x2; x3g, such that 0 < x1 < x2 < x3, the following inequality holds true:
  R x3x2 u00(x) dxR x3
x2
u0(x) dx
<
  R x3x1 u00(x) dxR x3
x1
u0(x) dx
. (1)
In Assumption 2, we make the standard assumption that taxpayers are risk averse,
i.e., u00(x) < 0, and that the more stringent condition (1) holds true. To interpret the
latter, observe that strict concavity of the utility function implies that
R x3
x2
u0(x) dx <R x3
x1
u0(x) dx. Hence, a necessary condition for inequality (1) to hold true is that
  R x3x2 u00(x) dx <   R x3x1 u00(x) dx, which in turn holds true if and only if u000(x) > 0.
Therefore, a necessary condition for inequality (1) to hold true is that the marginal
utility of income, u0(x), is a su¢ ciently convex function of income.
Condition (1) is satised, for instance, by the widely used class of isoelastic utility
functions, which exhibit constant relative risk aversion, and therefore also decreasing
absolute risk aversion. Appendix A contains the formal proof.
Notice also that condition (1) bears some resemblance to the standard condition
that the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion,  u00(x)=u0(x), is a decreasing function of
income.3 If the utility function u(:) exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, then
d( u00(x)=u0(x))
dx
=  u
000u0   (u00)2
(u0)2
< 0.
For any triplet of scalars fx1; x2; x3g, such that 0 < x1 < x2 < x3, the latter condition
also implies that:
 
Z x3
x2
u00(x)
u0(x)
dx <  
Z x3
x1
u00(x)
u0(x)
dx. (2)
Conditions (1) and (2) are similar but not equivalent. However, u000(x) > 0 is a necessary
condition for both inequalities to hold true.
Given the above assumptions, the problem of a typical taxpayer t 2 T is solved by
backward induction. Therefore, we begin by analyzing the second stage.
3.1 The second tax roll
While the choice (hide/do not hide) is the same in all stage 2 decision nodes, the nal
outcome is di¤erent, since each node is contingent on a di¤erent decision/outcome in
3The coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion is usually employed to assess how changes of an exogenous
variable a¤ect the optimal (interior) solution of a continuous variable of choice. Since in our model the
choice is discrete, we use a similar, but not equivalent, condition.
8
stage 1. In particular, if the taxpayer does not hide in stage 2, then her net income,
contingent on the decision node DN 2 f; ;   g, is equal to:
xDN2 = w
DN   f2,
where wDN is equal to:
w = w   c, if the taxpayer hides and is not caught in stage 1,
w = w   f1, if the taxpayer does not hide in stage 1,
w = w   c  f1, if the taxpayer hides and is caught in stage 1.
Note that, by Assumption 1(i):
w < w < w. (3)
If the taxpayer hides in stage 2, and then she is caught, her nal wealth is equal to:
xDN1 = w
DN   c  f2.
Finally, if the taxpayer hides in stage 2, and then she is not caught, her nal wealth is
equal to:
xDN3 = w
DN   c.
We are now ready to examine the optimal taxpayers choice at any given stage 2
decision node. Let EuDN be the expected utility of a taxpayer choosing to run away at
stage 2 decision node DN, and let CuDN be the certain utility of a taxpayer choosing
not to run away. At any given node DN, the taxpayer will change address if and only
if EuDN is strictly greater than CuDN, that is:
EuDN  (1  p)u(wDN   c) + pu(wDN   c  f2) > u(wDN   f2)  CuDN. (4)
Condition (4) can be expressed in terms of an inequality between the objective
probability of detection, p, and a type-specic probability, ~p(:), which reads as follows:
p <
u(wDN   c)  u(wDN   f2)
u(wDN   c)  u(wDN   c  f2)  ~p(w
DN; c; f2)  ~pDN. (5)
Condition (5) says that taxpayers for whom ~pDN > p will hide at stage 2 decision node
DN, while those for whom ~pDN  p will not hide. Notice that, by Assumption 1(i),
~pDN < 1.
A central result of the paper is contained in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 For all 0 < c < f2, the probability thresholds, ~p, ~p, and ~p, dened in
Eq. (5), are such that:
~p(w; c; f2) < ~p(w; c; f2) < ~p(w; c; f2), (6)
if and only if condition (1) given in Assumption 2 holds true.
Proof. By Eq. (3), w < w < w. Hence, inequalities (6) hold true if and only
if @~p2=@wDN > 0, for all 0 < c < f2. By di¤erentiating ~p2 in Eq. (5) with respect to
wDN, we get:
@~pDN
@wDN
=
u0(wDN   c)  u0(wDN   f2)
u(wDN   c)  u(wDN   c  f2) 
u0(wDN   c)  u0(wDN   c  f2)
u(wDN   c)  u(wDN   c  f2) ~p
DN. (7)
Let x1 = wDN   c  f2, x2 = wDN   f2, x3 = wDN   c, x1 < x2 < x3. Substituting for
~pDN into Eq. (7), the condition @~pDN2 =@w
DN > 0 can be written as:
 u
0(x3)  u0(x2)
u(x3)  u(x2) <  
u0(x3)  u0(x1)
u(x3)  u(x1) ,
which is equivalent to condition (1) given in Assumption 2. Condition (1) also implies
that @~pDN=@wDN > 0, for all 0 < c < f2. Hence condition (1) is both necessary and
su¢ cient for the inequalities (6) to hold true.
By Lemma 1, the set T of taxpayerstypes can be divided into four disjoint subsets,
which are dened as follows:
T000 = f t 2 T j ~p < ~p < ~p  pg , i.e., h2 = 0, h2 = 0, h2 = 0,
T001 = f t 2 T j ~p < ~p  p < ~pg , i.e., h2 = 0, h2 = 0, h2 = 1,
T011 = f t 2 T j ~p  p < ~p < ~pg , i.e., h2 = 0, h2 = 1, h2 = 1,
T111 = f t 2 T j p < ~p < ~p < ~pg , i.e., h2 = 1, h2 = 1, h2 = 1.
For instance, taxpayers belonging to the subset T011 are those not hiding at node DN*
but hiding at both nodes DN** and DN***.
Let
nj =
ZZZ
t2Tj
d(w; f1; f2), j 2 J = f000; 001; 011; 111g , (8)
be the mass of taxpayers belonging to subset Tj , j 2 J , dened above. By construction,P
j2J nj = 1.
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3.2 The rst tax roll
We now turn to the taxpayers decision at stage 1. If the taxpayer chooses to hide in
stage 1, and taking into account her optimal choices at stage 2 nodes DN*** and DN*,
her expected utility is equal to:
Eu(h1 = 1) = (1  p)max fEu;Cug+ pmax fEu;Cug ,
where EuDN and CuDN are dened in Eq. (4). If, instead, the taxpayer chooses not to
hide in stage 1, her expected utility is equal to:
Eu(h1 = 0) = max fEu;Cug .
Hence, the taxpayer will run away in stage 1 if and only if Eu(h1 = 1) > Eu(h1 = 0).
Denote with qj , j 2 J , the share of taxpayers belonging to subgroup Tj that opt for
hiding at stage 1. The total mass of taxpayers hiding at stage 1, i.e., the probability
that a generic taxpayer t 2 T chooses h1 = 1 at stage 1, is therefore equal to:
Pr(h1 = 1) =
X
j2J
njqj = n000q000 + n001q001 + n011q011 + n111q111. (9)
3.3 Probabilities of hiding at stage 2 decision nodes
By combining the population shares nj and qj , we can nally dene the probability
that a generic taxpayer called to take a decision at stage 2 node DN will opt for hiding
away from the tax authority. Consider, for instance, node DN***. The taxpayers that
choose h2 = 1 are those belonging to the subsets Tk, of mass nk, k 2 f001; 011; 111g. A
fraction (1 p)qk of the taxpayers belonging to these subsets have chosen to hide at stage
1 (h1 = 1) and have subsequently escaped notication (recall that the probability of
notication, p, is type independent). Therefore, the probability that a generic taxpayer
taking a decision at node DN*** opts for hiding is equal to:
Pr(h2 = 1jh1 = 1 and not notied) =
n001q001 + n011q011 + n111q111
Pr(h1 = 1)
. (10)
Similarly, the probability that a generic taxpayer taking a decision at node DN*
opts for hiding is equal to:
Pr(h2 = 1jh1 = 1 and notied) =
n111q111
Pr(h1 = 1)
. (11)
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Finally, the probability that a generic taxpayer taking a decision at node DN** opts
for hiding is equal to:
Pr(h2 = 1jh1 = 0, notied) =
n011(1  q011) + n111(1  q111)
1  Pr(h1 = 1) . (12)
The following proposition states the main result by comparing the probabilities
(10)(12) dened above.
Proposition 1 The ranking of the probabilities of hiding at the stage 2 decision nodes
is as follows:
 Pr(h2 = 1jh1 = 1 and not notied) > Pr(h2 = 1jh1 = 1 and notied).
 Pr(h2 = 1jh1 = 1 and notied) > Pr(h2 = 1jh1 = 0, notied) if and only if
q111 > Pr(h1 = 1)

1 +
n011(1  q011)
n111

. (13)
Proof. Both statements immediately follow by comparing Eq. (10) with Eq. (11),
and Eq. (11) with Eq. (12), respectively.
Proposition 1 shows that taxpayers that do not succeed in running away in stage
1 are less likely to run away also in stage 2 than taxpayers that escape the tax notice
in stage 1. In other terms, and taking stage 2 as a reference point, the experience of a
prior tax notice reduces the probability that a generic taxpayer attempts to escape the
current tax notice. This is exactly the main relationship which is tested in the following
empirical section. The intuition of the result is simple. Taxpayers that unsuccessfully
attempt to escape the tax notice in stage 1 su¤er a negative income e¤ect, compared to
taxpayers that successfully run away, since the former bear both the cost of changing
address and the cost of paying due taxes plus nes, while the latter bear only the
cost of changing address. Given that, by Assumption 2, a negative income e¤ect makes
individuals less prone to take risks, some of the unsuccessful stage 1 sco­ aws rationally
decide not to take chances in stage 2.
Proposition 1 also shows that taxpayers that do not run away in stage 1 are less
likely to run away in stage 2 than taxpayers that behave as sco­ aws in stage 1, provided
that inequality (13) is satised. Although it is not possible to characterize in analytical
terms the conditions under which inequality (13) holds true, informal arguments based
on economic intuition suggest that the inequality should hold true in most relevant
cases. In particular, it is reasonable to expect that both q111 > Pr(h1 = 1) and
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n011 < n111, in which case inequality (13) is likely to hold true. As for the former
inequality, the claim is that the probability q111 that taxpayers belonging to the subset
T111 (i.e., those running away at all stage 2 decision nodes) run away in stage 1 is
greater than the corresponding weighted probability Pr(h1 = 1), dened in Eq. (9),
referred to the entire population, which refers also to the subsets of taxpayers that do
not run away in at least one of stage 2 decision nodes (in particular, it is reasonable
to expect that q111 > q000, i.e., taxpayers running away at all stage 2 decision nodes
are more likely to run away in stage 1 than taxpayers never running away in stage
2). As for the second claim, i.e., n011 < n111, it is reasonable to expect that while
n111 and n000 take largevalues, n011 and n001 take instead smallvalues (recall thatP
j2J nj = 1), since the majority of taxpayers is likely to take the same action at all
stage 2 decision nodes. This is the case whenever the chain of inequalities shown in
Eq. (6) is composed of probabilities ~pDN which are closeto each other, as when gross
income and nes show a signicant positive correlation. In order to provide additional
support to these informal arguments, Appendix A presents some numerical simulations
of the model, showing that the ranking of the probabilities given in Proposition 1 holds
true.
Before moving to the empirical section of the paper  where we provide rst
evidence on the impact of a previous tax notice on the probability of trying to escape
a subsequent tax notice  two nal remarks are in order. The rst concerns the type
of impact we are able to disentangle in practice. In our empirical specication, see Eq.
(14) below, the probability of running away by changing address is conditioned only on a
previous notication of a tax roll, and not on previous decisions about address changes.
In terms of our theoretical model, see Figure 1, this means that the comparison we make
with the empirical model is between the probability of running away by taxpayers
moving from stage 2 decision node DN*** and the pooled group of taxpayers moving
from decision nodes DN* and DN**. Distinguishing the two latter groups of taxpayers
would require both a more general theoretical model (i.e., a model with more than two
stages) and a dynamic empirical model, in which the probability of changing address in
the current period is a function of address changes sometime in the previous periods.
The second remark concerns the assumption of taking as exogenously given the
original tax evasion decision, which is implicit in our theoretical framework. Indeed, if
the taxpayer is assumed to be forward looking, the details of the notication process are
likely to have an inuence also on the original evasion decision. For a given evasion level,
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an increase in the probability of notication reduces the expected utility from evasion
(even after the taxpayer adjusts, if necessary, her changing address decision). Then,
as a rst reaction, a risk-averse taxpayer might reduce the level of tax evasion, which
then in turn might decrease the probability of hiding to escape notication (because,
for instance, the costs of hiding are now greater than the due ne; see Assumption 1
above). However, given the substantial time lag for the audit and detection by Tax
Authorities to occur with respect to the year of original evasion decision (at least ve
to seven years), this argument does not seem to pose a serious problem both for our
theoretical argument and  most importantly  for our empirical test, to which now
we turn.
4 Testing the impact of a prior tax notice
4.1 Data and variables
For our empirical test, we exploit information on individual post-audit, post-detection
tax compliance les from seven distinct datasets referring to well-developed small- and
medium-sized provinces located in Northern Italy (Aosta, Belluno, Mantova, Modena,
Pordenone, Trento, and Treviso), including both residents and non-residents individu-
als. Since these provinces are similar in terms of per-capita income and demographic
characteristics, but di¤er somewhat as for their historical-cultural background and
political orientation, we consider separately the two samples of residents and non-
residents.4 Notice that relying on datasets concerning di¤erent social contexts for
assessing the e¤ect of tax notice experience on sco­ awsbehavior allows us to check
the robustness of our results with respect to sample perturbations.5
All data have been provided by the same agency (Uniriscossione S.p.A.), which was
the sole responsible for the enforcement of tax collection in all the seven provinces,
and refer to the universe of tax rolls issued in these provinces during the period 2004-
2007. The data provide information on individuals that (at least once) decided not to
regularly pay their taxes (or other revenue receipts) in the past, largely before 2004,
and were audited and detected by Tax Authorities. The complete dataset includes
4On the contrary, we eliminated from the original samples all individuals for whom the place of
residence is unknown. The main ndings presented here are not a¤ected by this procedure. Estimation
results based on the whole samples are available from the authors upon request.
5 Indeed, political ideology and cultural framework are likely to inuence tax evasion behaviour; see,
e.g., Cannari and DAlessio (2007) for a discussion based on survey data.
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about 250,000 observations: as for residents, we have 10,090 total observations for the
Aosta sample, 4,187 for Belluno, 24,078 for Mantova, 64,975 for Modena, 13,527 for
Pordenone, 18,575 for Trento, and 33,356 for Treviso; as for non-residents, we have
5,707 total observations for the Aosta sample, 2,923 for Belluno, 8,675 for Mantova,
24,622 for Modena, 6,117 for Pordenone, 9,270 for Trento, and 20,444 for Treviso.
The original data unit is the individuals tax return form. As described in Section
2, the rolls periodically issued by Tax Authorities are sent to the collection agency,
so that the latter registers the amount due by each individual for a given period in a
tax return form. For each individuals tax return form, our data include information
on: the gender and the age of the tax evader; the Municipality (if the individual is
Italian) or the State (for foreigners) where the tax evader was born; her residence
address (that allows us to distinguish the two samples of residents and non-residents);
eventual address changes with respect to the previous tax return form; the presence of
a previous tax return form successfully notied, from 2004 onwards; the taxpayersdue
amount.
From these original data, we dened the variables to be used in our empirical models.
In particular, our dependent variable is Prob_ADCHANGE, a dummy variable which
takes value one when the individual changed her address with respect to the previous
tax return form.6 Starting from a previous tax return form successfully notied, we
build our main independent variable, NOT, a dummy variable which takes value one
when the individual experienced a prior tax notice.7 We also control for the taxpayers
due amount. Unfortunately, available information is relative only to the whole due
amount of each tax return form, accrued to each individual in the period which the
form refers to, but not to the category of taxes cheated. These include evaded
taxes plus penalties, as well as other non-tax debts  such as royalty rents, nes
for tra¢ c violations and licence fees. Given the absence of any information on the
categoryof taxes cheated, to provide a rough control for this we clustered the total
due amount into four classes and dened a dummy variable for each class (TAX1,
TAX2, TAX3, TAX4, from less than 100 euro to more than 50,000 euro). Fees and nes
usually fall in the lowest classes, while taxes are more likely to be found in the highest
6 It is worth highlighting that the collection agency has an incentive to search for taxpayers, since it
receives a xed price for each notied tax debt. Hence the number of address changes is not a¤ected
by an opportunistic behaviour of the collection agency.
7 It is worth mentioning that the tax notice has been experienced from 2004 onwards, hence the
original tax evasion decision is referred to at least ve to seven years before.
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ones. Finally, in order to take into account residual heterogeneity across sco­ aws 
which could a¤ect their decision to move  we include in the estimated models control
variables for some cultural factors highlighted by the literature to be important in
inuencing tax compliance  like gender, age, and the birth place  considering the
variables FEM (a dummy for females); AGE1 to AGE5 (a set of dummies for age, from
individuals between 18 and 25 years old to individuals more than 65 years old); a rich
set of dummies for the birthplace (including four Italian macro-areas, and nine world
zones). Additional controls for unobserved heterogeneity stemming from di¤erences in
taxpayers socio-economic conditions (like income or the type of occupation) exploits
the panel structure of the data, considering a FIXED EFFECTS (FE) specication of
the empirical model. This is also a rough control for the attitude to move, which
may have inuenced the decision to run away in the past.
Table 1 lists all the variables used in the empirical analysis, together with their
corresponding denitions. Descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our em-
pirical exercise, distinguishing between the two samples of residents and non-residents,
and each province separately, are in Table 2, while statistics for the remaining vari-
ables are in Table B.1 in Appendix B. The probability of address change and of having
received a prior notice are clearly di¤erent between residents and non-residents. Con-
sidering the pooled samples, 53.6% of resident individuals changed their addresses,
compared with only 35.7% of non-residents. The corresponding means for the variable
NOT are 14.2% and 7.4%, respectively. We do not observe large di¤erences across
provinces with respect to these averages. As for residents, Prob_ADCHANGE ranges
from 51.2% in the case of Modena to 60.3% in the case of Aosta, while NOT goes from
9.7% for Aosta to 16.3% for Treviso. As for non-residents, Prob_ADCHANGE ranges
from 31.2% in the case of Belluno to 38.8% in the case of Modena, while NOT goes
from 5.2% for Belluno to 9% for Treviso. Despite these di¤erences, the distribution
of the amount of due taxes is somewhat similar across the two samples: in about one
fth of the tax return forms the due amount is lower than 100 euro, for both residents
and non-residents. The large majority of tax forms (about 60%) refers to amounts
between 100 euro and 2,000 euro. Less than one percent of observations are relative to
amounts above 50,000 euro. Also demographic characteristics of the two samples are
pretty much similar: most of the individuals are males (about 80%), half of which are
between 35 and 50 years old.
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4.2 Estimation strategy
Starting from the theoretical model described in Section 3, we investigate the taxpayers
choice of running away to escape the e¤ects of a tax notice by estimating di¤erent LO-
GIT model specications. Our dependent variable Prob_ADCHANGE is measured
here by the probability of changing residence address, which is assumed to be idiosyn-
cratic to each sco­ aw. The POOLED specication of the LOGIT model is represented
by the following equation:
(Prob_ADCHANGEi = 1j zi) = F
0@+ NOTi + 4X
j=1
jTAXji +
X
k
kXki
1A , (14)
where the dependent, NOT and TAXj variables are dened as before; zi is the vector
of explicative factors for the decision to runaway; F (:) is the Logistic CDF; nally,
Xki are the elements of Xi, the vector of demographic controls (including dummies
for gender, age, and the birth place) which provide a rough control for heterogeneity
across sco­ aws, including also cultural di¤erences with respect to tax compliance. To
explicitly allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity, we also estimate Eq. (14) with
a panel specication including individual xed e¤ects. Such a FE LOGIT specication
helps us to clear the impact of the prior notice on the probability to move from the
e¤ects of important taxpayers characteristics, like gross income level, the type of job
(e.g., public sector employees, self-employed workers, etc.), or the attitudeto move,
which could inuence both the upstream opportunity to evade and the subsequent
decision of moving.8
Notice that running FE LOGIT estimations helps to mitigate also the biases due
to potential endogeneity problems a¤ecting our key variable NOT. Indeed, as NOT
reects something like the past interaction of tax evaders with Tax Authorities, this
variable might be correlated with past individual decision to evade taxes. Given that
someone who was prepared to evade taxes in the past is also more likely to cheat
Tax Authorities now, both our dependent variable and NOT will be correlated with
unobserved characteristics of the individual that make her more/less prone to evade
taxes.
An additional (and connected) problem which could bias our results is due to the
potential inuence of NOT on the ex-ante amount of taxes evaded. However, as we
8For reasons of taxpayers privacy, this information about individual socio-economic attributes has
not been released by the collection agency. The inclusion of individual xed e¤ects permits also to take
into account individual-specic costs of moving, which cannot be measured directly.
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already observed, given the relevant time lag with which Tax Authorities e¤ectively
audit (from ve to seven years) and then notice (from one to three years) taxpayers
and the four-years span of our dataset, all the tax forms observed in our sample include
evaded amounts which have not been a¤ected by any of the tax notices observed in the
same sample.
As a nal robustness check, we estimate the FE version of the LOGIT model (14)
separately for the sub-samples of males and females. This allows us to control for
potential sample selection biases in our results. Indeed, as suggested by the household
and labour economics literature, females are usually less likely to take extremechoices
 such as, for instance, evade taxes or running away  and this result could turn out
in samples with female groups inated by worse sco­ aw behaviors compared to the
male ones.
4.3 Results
Estimates of Eq. (14) on the samples of residents and non-residents individuals (re-
ported in Appendix B, from Table B.2 to Table B.7) o¤er a consistent picture  both
across provinces and alternative model specications  of sco­ awsbehavior in terms
of the decision to run away in order to escape the tax notice. All the estimations
consider as a reference individual a taxpayer that did not receive any prior notice
(NOT = 0) and with a due amount above 50,000 euro (TAX4 = 1).9
A rst clear result emerging from our exercises is that residents and non-residents
are completely di¤erent individuals. Wald tests strongly conrm model validity for the
sample of residents only. Indeed, for non-residents, while Wald tests on the POOLED
specication are apparently conrming model validity, Wald tests on the FE specica-
tion strongly reject our model. All the coe¢ cients, but for some demographic controls
in the POOLED specications, are statistically insignicant at the usual conventional
levels. A likely interpretation is that non-residents are a bunch of highly heterogeneous
taxpayers, in terms of where they currently live, and the motivations for changing their
addresses (e.g., they moved simply because they changed their job). In what follows,
we then concentrate on the sample of resident individuals only.
Table 3 presents coe¢ cient and marginal e¤ect estimates for NOT, for all the
9 In the POOLED specication of LOGIT model, including also age and gender dummies, we
have assumed the reference sco­ aw to have an age between 18 and 25 (AGE1 = 1) and to be male
(FEM = 0).
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provinces and all our models. The impact is consistently negative and statistically
signicant across all the specications, including POOLED and FE LOGIT models.10
This indicates that the presence of a prior notice reduces the probability of changing
address, exerting a deterrent role similar to that of a prior audit highlighted by part of
the empirical literature based on both laboratory experiments (e.g., Spicer and Hero,
1985; Webley, 1987; Alm et al., 2009) and real data (e.g., Bergman and Nevarez, 2006;
Gemmell and Ratto, 2012). The magnitude of the marginal e¤ects is also very sim-
ilar across the di¤erent provinces and the di¤erent models, with most of the estimates
around a 10% reduction in the probability of running away in order to escape the no-
tice, and somewhat higher for just two provinces only (Treviso,  17%, and Belluno,
 23%). This result suggests that sco­ awsreaction to the enforcement e¤orts by Tax
Authorities is independent from the specic geographical context where the individuals
live. Comparing the male-only and female-only sub-samples, we nd that the impact
of prior notice is higher for females than for males, in ve out of seven provinces, with
Trento and Treviso being the only exceptions. Since the individuals belonging to our
datasets are extracted from the population of tax evaders, it is di¢ cult to advance any
specic interpretation for gender di¤erences in behavior.
To better study the impact of the prior notice on Prob_ADCHANGE, we further
estimated average predicted probabilities from the POOLED LOGIT model (Table 4),
considering also the role of the due amount and of demographic variables.11 Results
from this additional exercise conrm the view that the prior notice exerts a sizable
impact on the probability to runaway in order to escape notice, with the e¤ect consistent
across di¤erent provinces, di¤erent amounts, and di¤erent ages. First, considering the
averages across all individuals in the provincial samples, the probability of changing
address without having received a previous notice is between 53% and 61%, and reduces
10The robustness of our estimates after including individual xed e¤ects strongly suggests that the
potential problem of endogeneity of NOT, as well as of TAX1-TAX4 discussed below, is not a major
issue here. Indeed, as we already remarked, the long lag with which the notice usually occurs makes our
regressors truly exogenous. Notice that the number of total observations available for each province
signicantly reduces when running FE LOGIT models, since all the individuals with only one tax
return form have been dropped due to the inability of estimating the individual-specic xed e¤ect in
these cases.
11For the sake of brevity, we do not report here birth zone e¤ects. Notice, however, that these
variables are almost always negative, suggesting that individuals borne in places di¤erent from where
they actually live are probably less familiar with the social and economic context, and hence they run
away less.
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to between 52% and 38%. Most of the estimated impacts of NOT are around 10-12%,
but for Belluno (23%) and Treviso (17%). In most cases (but for Aosta), the probability
of running away to escape notice is below the 50% threshold, somewhat suggesting that
the notice is able to deter individuals from running away. Second, we do not nd a clear
pattern for the impact of notice across the di¤erent classes of the due amount of taxes.
Only in the case of Belluno (and, to some extent, Aosta), the predicted probability
of changing address is clearly increasing in the level of tax debt, both considering
NOT = 0 and NOT = 1. In the remaining provinces, we nd the opposite trend,
or a constant probability of moving across di¤erent classes. However, the estimated
reduction in the probability of moving is remarkably similar, for amounts of less than
100 euro to tax debts of more than 50,000 euro. Again, Belluno is an exception,
since we observe a 4 percentage points reduction in the estimated impact of NOT for
TAX4 with respect to the other classes, which is consistent with expectations. Notice
that, in this case, the probability of running away after having received a prior notice
is still 62% (from 80%), suggesting that NOT is likely to be ine¤ective in deterring
individuals from changing address to escape notice. Third, females are characterized
by a higher probability of moving than males in all provinces, both considering an
individual without a prior notice and an individual with a prior notice. As discussed
above, this evidence might be due to a sample selection bias, since individuals included
here are mostly tax cheaters. It is worth pointing out that the estimated impact of
NOT is, however, largely conrmed on both sub-samples. Finally, considering age, we
observe a large increase in the probability of running away when age increases, which
is consistent across di¤erent provinces. Despite the deterrent e¤ect of NOT, aged
individuals in our samples are characterized by a larger probability of moving with
respect to sample averages. In the case of Aosta, for instance, predicted probabilities
for those older than 65 (AGE5) are 68% and 58% respectively, again suggesting that
notice is likely to be ine¤ective in deterring illegal behaviors. Notice that the probability
of running away is larger than 50% in all provinces for individuals in the AGE5 class.
On the whole, our empirical test on the e¤ectiveness of prior tax notice suggests
that, for most individuals, the experience of a notice goes in the right direction and
signicantly reduces the probability of running away. However, some individuals, still
prefer to change address and avoid paying the bill. This evidence points toward an
hysteresis in the illegal behavior of tax evaders, with prior notice mostly ine¤ective
against some sco­ aws. Our ndings can help to explain the inability of tax collection
20
agencies in cashing due amounts from noncompliant taxpayers observed in the real
world: according to the latest estimates provided by the Agency for Internal Revenues
(Agenzia delle Entrate), in Italy, only 1.57% of the total amount on taxpayersrolls has
been cashed in 2007; but the same is true also in the US, where about 60% of identied
tax debts are never collected (Burman, 2003). Moreover, the evidence of weak prior
tax notice e¤ectiveness is also consistent with the results by Bergman and Nevarez
(2006) on VAT audit enforcement in Chile and Argentina: even if tax audits seem to
exert a discouraging impact towards those more prone to compliance, they have the
undesired e¤ect of furthering non-compliance among strong cheaters, who again exhibit
an hysteresis in their illegal behavior that enforcement activity is not able to stop.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we study whether the experience of a tax notice a¤ects individual future
compliance behavior after having being detected as a cheater. Di¤erently from previ-
ous literature on tax evasion decision, we focus here on a post-audit, post-detection
context, i.e., a framework in which taxpayers have been already detected by Tax Au-
thorities as noncompliant and they can decide to runaway in order to escape the notice
and avoid paying their tax debt, behaving as sco­ aws. The problem is substantial for
at least two reasons: rst, only a small percentage of the total amount of due taxes
on taxpayersrolls is actually cashed by collection agencies every year; second, avail-
able information indicates that in many cases the taxpayers address is unknown, and
a considerable number of individuals change residence address several times so as to
avoid tax notice consequences.
We rst provide a theoretical framework, by proposing a two-period dynamic model
à la Allingham and Sandmo (1972) to explain the individual choice of running away. We
show that, for risk averse individuals, a prior tax notice is likely to reduce the probability
of attempting to escape a subsequent tax notice by changing address. The empirical
analysis  which is based on real data provided by an Italian tax collection agency
 highlights that experiencing a tax notice impacts negatively on the probability of
changing address. However, for some individuals, this deterrent e¤ect is not enough to
discourage them from running away in order to avoid paying their dues. This implies
that the experience of a tax notice is potentially able to reduce the decision to move, but
the powerof the signal on the enforcement e¤orts by Tax Authorities (implicit in the
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notice) can be insu¢ cient to correct the individual incentive to escape Tax Authorities.
Our conclusions can help to draw some policy recommendations in order to in-
crease the percentage of total evaded taxes cashed by collection agencies. Prior tax
notice seems to be ine¤ective in discouraging non-compliance in some cases, so that
the power of the signal should be strengthened, for instance by setting a shorter
period within which the enforcement procedure may be applied, and by publishing the
names of tax evaders with a high number of address changes and large unresolved
liabilities. Moreover, it could be worth increasing also monetary burdens for sco­ aws,
e.g., by imposing a levy on tax evadersbank account, as well as by making more di¢ -
cult for them to get loans or to buy or sell real and nancial assets. All these policies
tend to increase the signal on the enforcement e¤orts via the tax notice.
Finally, our results suggest that future research on tax evasion should give more
thoughts to the post-detection, post-auditprocedures, as these appear to be as im-
portant as deterrence in inuencing the impact of the illegal behavior of tax evasion on
public nances. Discouraging and discovering tax cheating is just a rst step, which
lacks power if  at the end  governments are unable to really cash the due amounts.
Appendix A: Theoretical model
CRRA utility functions
Consider the class of isoelastic utility functions:
u(x) =
x1 
1   ,  > 0,  6= 1, (A.1)
where  represents the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. It is immediate to see that u0(x) =
x  > 0, u00(x) =  x (1+) < 0, u000(x) = (1 + )x (2+) > 0.
Given the utility function (A.1), inequality (1) is written as:
x 3   x 2
x1 3   x1 2
>
x 3   x 1
x1 3   x1 1
.
If 0 <  < 1, the latter inequality can be written as:
 x 2 x1 3   x 3 x1 1 + x 2 x1 1 >  x 1 x1 3   x 3 x1 2 + x 1 x1 2 .
Simplifying we get:
x3   x1
x3x

1
  x3   x2
x3x

2
  x2   x1
x2x

1
> 0.
The latter condition can then be written as:
x2(x3   x1)  x3(x2   x1)  x1(x3   x2) > 0.
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Finally, by adding and subtracting x2(x2   x1), the latter inequality can be written as:
x2   x1
x2   x1 >
x3   x2
x3   x2 ,
which holds true if 0 <  < 1. The proof for  > 1 is similar, and therefore it is omitted.
Numerical simulations
We provide a numerical simulation of the theoretical model by considering a population of 1,000
individuals. The utility function, identical for all individuals, is of the CRRA type dened in
Eq. (A.1).12 Gross income w is uniformly distributed on the closed interval [w_min; w_max].
The nes f1 and f2 are as follows:
f1 = a1w + (1  a1)y1, where a1 2 [0; 1] , y1 uniformly distributed on [y1_min; y1_max] ,
f2 = a2w + (1  a2)y2, where a2 2 [0; 1] , y2 uniformly distributed on [y2_min; y2_max] .
Hence, fk_min = akw_min+(1  ak)yk_min, fk_max = akw_max+(1  ak)yk_max,
k = 1; 2. If a1 > 0 and a2 > 0, then there is a positive correlation between gross income w and
nes f1 and f2, which is reasonable to assume.
The results of the simulation of eight di¤erent specications of the model are shown in
Table A.1. The various simulations di¤er with respect to the degree of correlation between
gross income and nes, the degree of taxpayers risk aversion, the probability of detection, the
average levels of income and nes. Notice that, in all simulations, q111 > Pr(h1 = 1). Moreover,
n011 < :2 but in simulation VIII in which it is equal to .364. Therefore, in all cases,
Pr(h2 = 1jh1 = 1 and notied) > Pr(h2 = 1jh1 = 0, notied),
as discussed in Section 3 when commenting the results shown in Proposition 1.
Appendix B: Additional tables of the empirical analysis
Tables from B.1 to B7.
12The Excel spreadsheet used to compute the numerical simulation is available from the authors
upon request.
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Figure 1: The decision tree of a typical taxpayer
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Table 1. Definition of the variables used in the estimated LO GIT models 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Prob_ADCHANGE Probability that the individual runs away to escape tax notice 
NOT 1: the individual has experienced a prior notice 
TAX1 1: the amount of the tax roll is until 100 € 
TAX2 1: the amount of the tax roll is between 101 and 2,000 € 
TAX3 1: the amount of the tax roll is between 2,001 and 50,000 € 
TAX4 1: the amount of the tax roll is over 50,000 € 
FEM 1: the individual is a female 
AGE1 1: the age of the individual is between 18 and 25 
AGE2 1: the age of the individual is between 26 and 35 
AGE3 1: the age of the individual is between 36 and 50 
AGE4 1: the age of the individual is between 51 and 65 
AGE5 1: the age of the individual is over 65 
 
 Table 2. Summary statistics of the main variables  (used in all the estimated LO GIT models) 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO POOLED SAMPLES 
Sample of resident individuals 
 mean  st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean   st.dev. mean  st.dev. 
Prob_ADCHANGE 0.603 0.489 0.570 0.495 0.527 0.499 0.512 0.500 0.563 0.496 0.540 0.498 0.554 0.497 0.536 0.499 
NOT 0.097 0.296 0.160 0.367 0.115 0.320 0.153 0.360 0.126 0.332 0.135 0.342 0.163 0.370 0.142 0.349 
TAX1 0.242 0.428 0.257 0.437 0.219 0.414 0.204 0.403 0.231 0.422 0.230 0.421 0.235 0.424 0.221 0.415 
TAX2 0.594 0.491 0.567 0.496 0.602 0.490 0.648 0.478 0.627 0.484 0.610 0.488 0.581 0.493 0.617 0.486 
TAX3 0.161 0.367 0.171 0.377 0.176 0.380 0.145 0.352 0.139 0.346 0.157 0.363 0.181 0.385 0.159 0.366 
TAX4 0.003 0.054 0.005 0.071 0.003 0.058 0.003 0.051 0.002 0.049 0.004 0.064 0.003 0.055 0.003 0.055 
Observations 10,090 4,187 24,078 64,975 13,527 18,575 33,356 168,788 
Sample of non -resident individ uals 
 mean  st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean   st.dev. mean  st.dev. 
Prob_ADCHANGE 0.375 0.484 0.312 0.464 0.339 0.473 0.388 0.487      0.321     0.467       0.335     0.472  0.349 0.477 0.357 0.479 
NOT 0.067 0.250 0.052 0.223 0.069 0.254 0.078 0.268      0.059     0.235       0.055     0.229  0.090 0.286 0.074 0.262 
TAX1 0.278 0.448 0.195 0.396 0.208 0.406 0.201 0.400      0.214     0.410       0.224     0.417  0.224 0.417 0.217 0.412 
TAX2 0.590 0.492 0.585 0.493 0.631 0.482 0.628 0.483      0.644     0.479       0.600     0.490  0.592 0.491 0.613 0.487 
TAX3 0.131 0.338 0.218 0.413 0.159 0.366 0.169 0.375      0.140     0.347       0.173     0.379  0.180 0.384 0.168 0.374 
TAX4 0.001 0.023 0.002 0.049 0.001 0.036 0.002 0.042      0.002     0.049       0.002     0.048  0.003 0.058 0.002 0.047 
Observations 5,707 2,923 8,675 24,622 6,117 9,270 20,444 77,758 
 
  
 
Table 3. Coef ficient and marginal ef f ect estimates for NOT – sample of resident individuals  
  PO OLED L O GIT model FE LO GIT model 
FE LO GIT model (male 
only) 
FE LO GIT model (female 
only) 
 Province Coeff. s.e. Mg. eff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Mg. eff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Mg. eff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Mg. eff. s.e. 
AOSTA -0.391*** 0.068 -0.096*** 0.018 -0.421*** 0.090 -0.074*** 0.026 -0.334*** 0.118 -0.060** 0.026 -0.710*** 0.216 -0.108* 0.058 
BELLUNO -0.918*** 0.089 -0.226*** 0.022 -0.782*** 0.151 -0.122*** 0.045 -0.755*** 0.188 -0.106** 0.046 -0.900** 0.353 -0.211 0.156 
MANTOVA -0.441*** 0.041 -0.110*** 0.010 -0.416*** 0.080 -0.103*** 0.017 -0.403*** 0.085 -0.100*** 0.018 -0.484*** 0.161 -0.117*** 0.043 
MODENA -0.445*** 0.022 -0.111*** 0.005 -0.438*** 0.037 -0.109*** 0.008 -0.427*** 0.044 -0.106*** 0.009 -0.476*** 0.068 -0.116*** 0.017 
PORDENONE -0.496*** 0.053 -0.123*** 0.014 -0.364*** 0.082 -0.089*** 0.021 -0.361*** 0.096 -0.088*** 0.020 -0.384** 0.182 -0.095** 0.045 
TRENTO -0.442*** 0.044 -0.110*** 0.012 -0.313*** 0.078 -0.072*** 0.016 -0.330*** 0.081 -0.076*** 0.018 -0.247 0.157 -0.051 0.038 
TREVISO -0.681*** 0.030 -0.169*** 0.007 -0.580*** 0.058 -0.137*** 0.013 -0.628*** 0.064 -0.145*** 0.015 -0.365*** 0.107 -0.081** 0.039 
 
 
  
Table 4. Average predicted probabilities from POOLED L O GIT model – sample of resident individuals  
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO 
NOT 0 1 Δ  0 1 Δ  0 1 Δ  0 1 Δ  0 1 Δ  0 1 Δ  0 1 Δ  
All 0.61 0.52 -10% 0.61 0.38 -23% 0.54 0.43 -11% 0.53 0.42 -11% 0.58 0.46 -12% 0.55 0.45 -11% 0.58 0.41 -17% 
TAX1 = 1 0.60 0.50 -10% 0.59 0.36 -23% 0.54 0.44 -10% 0.53 0.42 -11% 0.59 0.47 -12% 0.55 0.43 -12% 0.58 0.41 -17% 
TAX2 = 1 0.61 0.52    -9% 0.62 0.39 -23% 0.54 0.44 -10% 0.53 0.43 -10% 0.59 0.46 -13% 0.56 0.45 -11% 0.58 0.42 -16% 
TAX3 = 1 0.63 0.54    -9% 0.59 0.37 -22% 0.52 0.41 -11% 0.50 0.39 -11% 0.52 0.41 -11% 0.56 0.45 -11% 0.57 0.40 -17% 
TAX4 = 1 0.70 -  - 0.80 0.62 -18% 0.45 0.34 -11% 0.42 0.32 -10% 0.49 0.33 -16% 0.51 0.39 -12% 0.58 0.42 -16% 
FEM = 0 0.60 0.51 -10% 0.60 0.37 -23% 0.53 0.43 -11% 0.52 0.41 -11% 0.57 0.45 -12% 0.55 0.44 -11% 0.58 0.41 -17% 
FEM = 1 0.64 0.54 -10% 0.65 0.42 -23% 0.57 0.46 -11% 0.57 0.46 -11% 0.61 0.49 -12% 0.58 0.47 -11% 0.61 0.44 -17% 
AGE1 = 1 0.54 0.46    -8% 0.50 0.29 -21% 0.51 0.40 -11% 0.47 0.36 -10% 0.49 0.37 -12% 0.50 0.40 -10% 0.55 0.38 -17% 
AGE2 = 1 0.59 0.50 -10% 0.59 0.37 -22% 0.53 0.42 -11% 0.51 0.40 -11% 0.55 0.43 -12% 0.54 0.43 -11% 0.57 0.40 -17% 
AGE3 = 1 0.61 0.52    -9% 0.60 0.38 -22% 0.53 0.42 -11% 0.52 0.42 -11% 0.58 0.45 -12% 0.55 0.44 -11% 0.57 0.40 -17% 
AGE4 = 1 0.61 0.52 -10% 0.64 0.41 -23% 0.57 0.46 -11% 0.56 0.45 -11% 0.60 0.48 -12% 0.58 0.47 -11% 0.60 0.43 -17% 
AGE5 = 1 0.68 0.58 -10% 0.70 0.51 -20% 0.64 0.54 -10% 0.63 0.52 -11% 0.68 0.57 -11% 0.66 0.55 -11% 0.68 0.52 -16% 
Table A.1: Numerical simulations of the theoretical model
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
w_min 15,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 15,00 15,00
w_max 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 25,00 30,00 25,00 25,00
f1_min 2,00 1,00 2,00 2,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 5,00
f1_max 5,00 6,00 5,00 7,00 7,00 11,00 8,00 8,00
f2_min 2,00 1,00 2,00 2,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 5,00
f2_max 5,00 6,00 5,00 7,00 7,00 11,00 8,00 8,00
a1 0,20 0,20 0,10 0,20 0,25 0,40 0,30 0,50
a2 0,20 0,20 0,10 0,20 0,25 0,40 0,30 0,50
c(w,f1) 0,89 0,55 0,45 0,55 0,58 0,83 0,60 0,93
c(w,f2) 0,89 0,55 0,45 0,55 0,58 0,83 0,60 0,93
c 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00
rho 2,00 2,00 2,00 1,00 1,00 4,00 0,50 2,00
p 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,50 0,30 0,50 0,40
n000 59,00 59,00 62,00 22,00 59,00 16,80 43,00 8,00
n001 2,70 2,10 4,00 1,30 2,80 8,40 0,50 8,50
n011 4,10 4,50 5,70 3,00 3,20 16,50 1,80 36,40
n111 34,20 34,40 28,30 73,70 35,00 58,10 54,70 47,10
q000 10,34 30,17 26,94 60,91 29,49 35,71 45,81 30,00
q001 48,15 80,95 35,00 76,92 67,86 41,67 100,00 57,65
q011 46,34 31,11 36,84 83,33 28,13 63,03 66,67 79,67
q111 84,21 52,91 47,70 80,87 52,00 91,05 63,80 95,97
Pr(h1=1) 38,10 39,10 33,70 76,50 38,40 72,80 56,30 81,50
Pr*** 83,99 54,48 50,45 82,48 54,69 91,76 65,01 97,06
Pr* 75,59 46,55 40,06 77,91 47,40 72,66 61,99 55,46
Pr** 12,28 31,69 27,75 62,13 31,01 42,28 46,68 50,27
c(w,f1) = correlation between w and f1
c(w,f2) = correlation between w and f1
c = cost of hiding
rho = coefficient of relative risk aversion
p = probability of detection
  Table B.1. Summary statistics of the control variables  (used in the estimated POOLED LO GIT model) 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO POOLED SAMPLES 
Sample of resident individuals 
 mean  st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean   st.dev. mean  st.dev. 
FEM 0.225 0.418 0.157 0.364 0.164 0.370 0.206 0.404 0.196 0.397 0.180 0.384 0.186 0.389 0.192 0.394 
AGE1 0.019 0.137 0.031 0.172 0.021 0.142 0.021 0.143 0.017 0.129 0.025 0.157 0.020 0.140 0.021 0.143 
AGE2 0.198 0.398 0.228 0.419 0.264 0.441 0.244 0.430 0.219 0.413 0.241 0.428 0.235 0.424 0.240 0.427 
AGE3 0.483 0.500 0.467 0.499 0.497 0.500 0.512 0.500 0.505 0.500 0.487 0.500 0.498 0.500 0.501 0.500 
AGE4 0.256 0.436 0.235 0.424 0.180 0.385 0.188 0.390 0.222 0.416 0.213 0.409 0.208 0.406 0.201 0.401 
AGE5 0.045 0.207 0.039 0.194 0.038 0.191 0.035 0.185 0.038 0.191 0.034 0.181 0.039 0.194 0.037 0.189 
Observations 10,090 4,187 24,078 64,975 13,527 18,575 33,356 168,788 
Sample of non -resident individ uals 
 mean  st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean  st.dev. mean   st.dev. mean  st.dev. 
FEM 0.235 0.424 0.175 0.380 0.162 0.368 0.194 0.396 0.179 0.383 0.170 0.375 0.176 0.381 0.184 0.387 
AGE1 0.013 0.115 0.023 0.149 0.017 0.129 0.019 0.136 0.013 0.111 0.023 0.149 0.024 0.152 0.020 0.139 
AGE2 0.187 0.390 0.205 0.404 0.233 0.423 0.241 0.428 0.199 0.399 0.235 0.424 0.232 0.422 0.228 0.420 
AGE3 0.475 0.499 0.472 0.499 0.463 0.499 0.470 0.499 0.469 0.499 0.465 0.499 0.466 0.499 0.468 0.499 
AGE4 0.271 0.444 0.267 0.443 0.232 0.422 0.224 0.417 0.269 0.443 0.235 0.424 0.235 0.424 0.238 0.426 
AGE5 0.054 0.227 0.033 0.178 0.055 0.228 0.045 0.208 0.051 0.220 0.043 0.202 0.043 0.203 0.046 0.210 
Observations 5,707 2,923 8,675 24,622 6,117 9,270 20,444 77,758 
 Table B.2. Coef ficient estimates from POOLED LO GIT model – sample of resident individuals 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO 
Regressors a Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
NOT -0.391 0.068 *** -0.918 0.089 *** -0.441 0.041 *** -0.445 0.022 *** -0.496 0.053 *** -0.442 0.044 *** -0.681 0.030 *** 
TAX1 -0.459 0.409  -1.004 0.462 ** 0.450 0.226 ** 0.443 0.160 *** 0.417 0.351  0.179 0.235  0.014 0.209  
TAX2 -0.364 0.408  -0.836 0.459 * 0.461 0.225 ** 0.461 0.159 *** 0.388 0.350  0.244 0.234  0.046 0.209  
TAX3 -0.301 0.410  -0.957 0.463 ** 0.361 0.226  0.316 0.160 ** 0.140 0.352  0.248 0.236  -0.025 0.208  
FEM 0.158 0.050 *** 0.202 0.090 ** 0.087 0.036 ** 0.178 0.020 *** 0.145 0.045 *** 0.106 0.039 *** 0.089 0.029 *** 
AGE2 0.180 0.152  0.382 0.197 * 0.048 0.093  0.165 0.057 *** 0.230 0.138 * 0.149 0.098  0.078 0.081  
AGE3 0.266 0.148 * 0.391 0.192 ** 0.068 0.092  0.226 0.056 *** 0.328 0.135 ** 0.167 0.095 * 0.070 0.080  
AGE4 0.265 0.151 * 0.493 0.198 ** 0.167 0.096 * 0.344 0.058 *** 0.421 0.138 *** 0.280 0.099 *** 0.183 0.082 ** 
AGE5 0.583 0.178 *** 0.788 0.252 *** 0.439 0.114 *** 0.585 0.070 *** 0.748 0.163 *** 0.618 0.125 *** 0.517 0.098 *** 
Constant 0.637 0.456  1.015 0.496 ** -0.365 0.251  0.126 0.630  -0.239 0.437  -0.587 0.430  0.235 0.247  
Observations 10,090 4,187 24,078 64,975 13,527 18,575 33,356 
Wald test [p-
value]                  102 [0.000]                 161 [0.000]                   265 [0.000]                   806 [0.000]                  201 [0.000]                    213 [0.000]                   688 [0.000] 
a Dependent variable: Prob_ADCHANGE. Reference individual: NOT = 0, TAX4 = 1, FEM = 0, AGE1 = 1; dummies for birth place included (4 Italian and 9 
world geographical zones). Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; s.e. are robust standard errors. 
 
Table B.3. Coef ficient estimates from FE LO GIT model – sample of resident individuals  
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO 
Regressors a Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
NOT -0.421 0.090 *** -0.782 0.151 *** -0.416 0.080 *** -0.438 0.037 *** -0.364 0.082 *** -0.313 0.078 *** -0.580 0.058 *** 
TAX1 -1.228 0.474 *** -1.127 0.640 * 0.353 0.299  0.032 0.180  -0.207 0.474  -0.604 0.256 ** -0.259 0.369  
TAX2 -0.996 0.471 ** -1.001 0.606 * 0.380 0.296  0.144 0.184  -0.143 0.471  -0.409 0.264  -0.120 0.369  
TAX3 -0.868 0.463 * -1.073 0.634 * 0.372 0.302  0.182 0.187  -0.156 0.481  -0.323 0.271  -0.153 0.364  
Observations 6,317 2,415 15,494 46,268 8,489 12,162 21,022 
Wald test [p-
value]                    34 [0.000]                    29 [0.000]                      28 [0.000]                    184 [0.000]                    20 [0.000]                      40 [0.000]                    119 [0.000] 
a Dependent variable: Prob_ADCHANGE. Reference individual: NOT = 0, TAX4 = 1; individual fixed effects included. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; s.e. 
are robust standard errors. 
 Table B.4. Coef ficient estimates from FE LO GIT model – sample of resident individuals (male only) 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO 
Regressors a Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
NOT -0.334 0.118 *** -0.755 0.188 *** -0.403 0.085 *** -0.427 0.044 *** -0.361 0.096 *** -0.330 0.081 *** -0.628 0.064 *** 
TAX1 -1.215 0.685 * -1.355 0.613 ** 0.312 0.352  0.081 0.217  -0.089 0.469  -0.558 0.314 * -0.350 0.306  
TAX2 -0.989 0.680  -1.172 0.611 * 0.353 0.354  0.178 0.208  -0.025 0.468  -0.389 0.306  -0.205 0.297  
TAX3 -0.882 0.668  -1.239 0.627 ** 0.316 0.354  0.220 0.205  -0.028 0.480  -0.299 0.310  -0.219 0.291  
Observations  5,098 2,114 13,368   37,892   7,021 10,242 17,591 
Wald test [p-
value]                     24 [0.000]                    21 [0.000]                      35 [0.000]                     121 [0.000]                      16 [0.001]                      39 [0.000]                    108 [0.000] 
a Dependent variable: Prob_ADCHANGE. Reference individual: NOT = 0, TAX4 = 1; individual fixed effects included. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; s.e. 
are robust standard errors. 
 
 
Table B.5. Coef ficient estimates from FE LO GIT model – sample of resident individuals (female only) 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO 
Regressors a Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
NOT -0.710 0.216 *** -0.900 0.353 ** -0.484 0.161 *** -0.476 0.068 *** -0.384 0.182 *** -0.247 0.157  -0.365 0.107 *** 
TAX1 -1.361 1.277  0.196 0.301  0.601 0.837  -0.171 0.437  0.015 0.210  -1.023 1.041  0.828 1.114  
TAX2 -1.091 1.270  -0.146 0.363  0.536 0.830  0.009 0.435  0.077 0.185  -0.698 1.035  0.923 1.112  
TAX3 -0.828 1.265  -0.125 0.921  0.733 0.833  0.029 0.436  0.124 0.453  -0.627 1.033  0.765 1.110  
Observations 1,219   301 2,126  8,376 1,468   1,920   3,431 
Wald test [p-
value]                    14 [0.007]                    8 [0.095]                    11 [0.029]                    42 [0.000]                      8 [0.088]                      10 [0.050]                      13 [0.011] 
a Dependent variable: Prob_ADCHANGE. Reference individual: NOT = 0, TAX4 = 1; individual fixed effects included. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; s.e. 
are robust standard errors. 
 Table B.6. Coef ficient estimates from POOLED LO GIT model – sample of non-resident individuals 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO 
Regressors a Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
NOT -0.004 0.111  0.135 0.182  -0.489 0.401  -0.100 0.150  -0.229 0.125  0.118 0.099  -0.040 0.053  
TAX1 0.194 1.271  1.022 1.168  -0.101 0.722  -0.135 0.306  -0.213 0.489  -0.168 0.486  -0.360 0.251  
TAX2 0.346 1.270  1.148 1.166  -0.188 0.721  -0.245 0.305  -0.208 0.487  0.001 0.484  -0.342 0.250  
TAX3 0.295 1.272  1.149 1.168  -0.148 0.722  -0.381 0.306  -0.139 0.491  0.056 0.486  -0.408 0.252  
FEM -0.178 0.067 *** 0.059 0.109  0.097 0.064  0.047 0.034  -0.090 0.075  -0.001 0.061  0.005 0.040  
AGE2 0.151 0.248  -0.107 0.271  -0.181 0.175  -0.082 0.098  -0.162 0.233  0.270 0.158 * 0.303 0.103 *** 
AGE3 0.029 0.243  -0.043 0.263  -0.310 0.173 * -0.133 0.096  -0.389 0.229 * 0.211 0.155  0.245 0.101 ** 
AGE4 -0.270 0.246  -0.305 0.273  -0.456 0.178 ** -0.240 0.098 ** -0.737 0.233 *** -0.114 0.160  0.125 0.104  
AGE5 -0.232 0.270  -0.329 0.354  -0.681 0.204 *** -0.255 0.113 ** -1.046 0.268 *** -0.274 0.192  0.022 0.125  
Constant -0.860 1.292  -1.650 1.202  -0.517 0.742  0.033 0.325  0.192 0.545  -0.590 0.514  -0.485 0.271 * 
Observations 5,707 2,923 8,675 24,622 6,117 9,270 20,444 
Wald test [p-
value]                  103 [0.000]                 105 [0.000]                    343 [0.000]                   322 [0.000]                  243 [0.000]                    320 [0.000]                    460 [0.000] 
a Dependent variable: Prob_ADCHANGE. Reference individual: NOT = 0, TAX4 = 1, FEM = 0, AGE1 = 1; dummies for birth place included (4 Italian and 9 
world geographical zones). Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; s.e. are robust standard errors. 
Table B.7. Coef ficient estimates from FE LO GIT model – sample of non-resident individuals 
Province AOSTA BELLUNO MANTOVA MODENA PORDENONE TRENTO TREVISO 
Regressors a Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e.  
NOT -0.432 0.384  -0.192 0.318  -1.218 1.201  -0.545 0.687  -0.914 0.829  -0.534 0.583  -0.288 0.388  
TAX1 0.050 0.113  -0.447 1.506  -0.642 1.231  -0.285 0.476  -0.022 0.736  -0.524 0.747  -0.576 0.356  
TAX2 -0.170 0.159  0.027 1.494  -0.703 1.227  -0.239 0.473  -0.094 0.729  -0.386 0.746  -0.504 0.352  
TAX3 -0.120 0.420  -1.073 0.600  -0.688 1.225  -0.369 0.475  -0.174 0.734  -0.391 0.748  -0.570 0.353  
Observations 2,393    920 2,944 10,778 1,992 3,009 8,579 
Wald test [p-
value]                      5 [0.249]                      6 [0.197]                      7 [0.121]                        6 [0.204]                      3 [0.535]                      5 [0.316]                      6 [0.178] 
a Dependent variable: Prob_ADCHANGE. Reference individual: NOT = 0, TAX4 = 1; individual fixed effects included. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%; s.e. 
are robust standard errors. 
